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Earlier this year, the European Central Bank agreed to release minutes of its governing council
meetings in response to criticism over the lack of transparency in its decision-making. Sebastian
Diessner writes that while there are good reasons to support the ECB becoming more transparent,
lessons should also be learned from the experiences of other central banks. He notes that too much
transparency can inhibit discussions and thereby lead to less eﬀective monetary policy overall.
The 22nd of January 2015 must rank as a truly memorable date for the ECB. Belatedly, the central
bank’s governing council ﬁnally announced that it would emulate the actions of its major
counterparts in the developed world and embark on a programme of quantitative easing of substantive proportions.
The run-up and aftermath of the decision saw an unprecedented degree of salience for Eurozone monetary policy,
accompanied by unparalleled media coverage, with TV stations all over Europe broadcasting live the proceedings of
President Draghi’s press statement and the subsequent Q&A session. Germany’s principal publicly owned TV
channel even went so far as to run an unscheduled special programme right after the 8pm news, usually reserved
for extreme situations such as natural disasters or violent conﬂicts.
While such a degree of publicity might be more than
the Bank generally feels comfortable with, it will likely
have to get used to it – and should ideally cope with it
proactively. This chimes in with the long-standing
dispute about the accountability of the ECB and how
it can be enhanced, a debate that is as old as the
Eurosystem itself and that has intensiﬁed throughout
the Eurozone crisis.
In the shadow of the much-discussed decisions taken
in January, another novelty introduced on the very
same day went almost unnoticed. For the ﬁrst time
since its creation, the ECB would start to release the
minutes of its governing council meetings – albeit in
summarised form and with a four-week delay – in an
attempt to increase the transparency of its decision-
making and thus its accountability to the general
public.
Some early commentators benignly concluded that the release constituted a step in the right direction regarding the
old issue of accountability. As we now know more about the actual course of action of the monetary policy meetings
(for example, with regard to introductory presentations that are held by executive members and that serve to reﬂect
cleavages in the council), the ECB’s transparency is somewhat increased.
Yet, these changes will hardly suﬃce to appease observers. The reason is that they are merely of a procedural
nature and thus yield one-oﬀ eﬀects. We are now better informed about the general proceedings of all meetings, but
not necessarily about their evolving content – that is, about their substance. Critics have long classiﬁed this lack of
substantial information as an overt accountability deﬁcit that the ECB displays vis-à-vis other major central banks,
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and they are usually quick to recite what appear to be the facts: the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and the
Bank of Japan all provide detailed minutes or even verbatim transcripts of their monetary policy meetings, while the
ECB doesn’t.
But this is only part of the story. As justiﬁed as these critiques are, most if not all of them fail to dig deeper and to
account for the actual experiences the ECB’s counterparts have had with the publication of committee transcripts.
The Federal Reserve’s history provides us with an incisive natural experiment in this regard. In 1993, it came to light
that Fed staﬀ had for years typed up and archived recordings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the
principal organ of US monetary policy, without members of the committee being aware of it. In the ensuing
discussions with Congress, the Fed later agreed to publish the transcribed recordings and to oﬃcially start releasing
future FOMC transcripts, with a ﬁve-year delay.
This left scholars with a formidable opportunity to study the eﬀects of full-blown committee transparency on
monetary policy-making, and the results are informative, not least for the ECB. To all intents and purposes, the
knowledge that every single word of policy meetings would be made public in a few years’ time decidedly impaired
the previously candid debates between policy-makers, with spontaneous and free-ﬂowing discussions being
replaced by pre-prepared texts. Transparency had thus undermined the very deliberations that were hoped to be
elucidated, nurturing the painful truth that openness may compromise eﬀective monetary policy more than it furthers
it.
Meanwhile, the academic and societal battle over whether and how the ECB’s accountability can be enhanced will
rage on, with the institution’s increased visibility having culminated in an unlikely outburst of public disaﬀection by
protesters of the anti-austerity ‘Blockupy’ movement lately (cause for another unscheduled programme on German
TV, yet this time truly featuring a fair amount of violent conﬂict). This battle will not be contained by the recent
disclosure of unattributed meeting minutes, and it will far more likely be fought over the release of more detailed
verbatim transcripts including governing council members’ voting records.
Yet, sensitivity for the diﬃcult trade-oﬀs in the realm of central bank transparency is clearly advisable, and the Fed’s
experience with transcripts hints that there is indeed a very ﬁne line to tread between the appropriate oversight and
the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. In this vein, one-sided calls for the release of ever more internal documents are
unlikely to satisfy the complex demands that central bank committees like the ECB governing council will be faced
with in the future.
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